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Religious Culture: Faith in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia 
Jerry Pankhurst 
 
The former Soviet Union is undergoing a religious revival. People inside 
and outside the Russian Orthodox church are reexamining its ancient 
ways, rediscovering its long-forgotten saints, searching its institutional 
memory for answers to urgent questions facing the nation. The Western 
reaction to this remarkable resurgence of religion in Russia has been 
mixed. All observers welcome the fact that free inquiry about religion and 
free religious worship have been restored in the Russian Federation. At 
the same time, many are concerned about the xenophobic tendencies that 
have accompanied the religious revival in Russia and that became 
especially evident after the liberal forces suffered a defeat in the 
December 1993 parliamentary election. Calls to restore the great Russian 
empire sounded by the winners brought to mind the old slogan, "Moscow, 
the Third Rome," that had spurred Muscovy in the 16th-17th centuries to 
expand its dominion over neighboring countries. The situation is further 
exacerbated by a few Archbishops and Metropolitans who exhort the 
Russian people to bring the orthodox, unchanging faith -- Pravoslavie -- to 
the world. 
But Western evangelicals who flock to Russia hoping to save it from itself 
find themselves in an awkward position. Ironically, they act as a 
missionary force that tries to sever Russian Orthodoxy from its traditional 
moorings and in the process could inadvertently transform the present 
religious revival into yet another victory for secularism. Just as their well-
meaning counterparts are intent on building capitalism in Russia (a project 
no less heroic than that of building communism), Western religionists are 
determined to bring the reformation to a country that missed its chance at 
religious reform in the sixteenth century. But the Russians have seen all 
this before. Was not the Bolshevik Revolution a drive to impose Western 
enlightenment on the dark East and to replace its backward mores with 
the imported prescriptions for universal happiness? 
While we cannot -- and should not -- avoid passing a judgment about the 
path that the religious revival has taken in Russia, we need to resist the 
temptation of imposing our ready-made schemes on a vastly different 
country without doing justice to its unique religious culture. It would be 
prudent to defer our judgment until we had a chance to examine the 
origins of Pravoslavie and the role it played in the nation's history, 
including the transformation that the Orthodox faith and church 
institutions underwent during the Soviet era. 
The term "religious culture" refers here not only to the life of the Russian 
Orthodox Church -- its religious corpus, worship rituals, and organizational 
principles, but also to a wider range of social practices that bear the 
imprint of Russian Orthodoxy. Russian religious culture has left its mark 
on every cultural domain in the nation. Its pervasiveness has much to do 
with the fact that the Russian Orthodox Church had been the favored 
religious organization in the land from at least the tenth century on. 
Adopted as the official faith of all Russias , Eastern Christianity remained 
inexorably tied to the state. When the state faltered under invasion and 
foreign control, the Church continued to nurture a sense of nationhood for 
Russians, preventing society from splintering and disintegrating. When the 
state regained its strength, the Church lent its considerable legitimizing 
power to the government and the state's imperial expansion. Hence, the 
strong historical bond that was formed between Russianness as an ethnic 
or national identity and Russian Orthodoxy as a religious affiliation. 
By certain Western Christian (e.g., evangelical Protestant) standards, 
membership in a church is realized through regular participation and overt 
commitment to the church's values and goals. The Russian Orthodox 
Church adopts a far broader perspective on membership. One gains 
membership in the Russian Orthodox Church first and foremost through 
baptism performed at birth and only secondarily through participation in 
religious worship. The latter could be very sporadic without affecting the 
person's standing as an Orthodox faithful. Barring explicit evidence to the 
contrary, one's membership in the Orthodox Church was presumed to be 
established if one was born Russian. This applied not only to Orthodox 
Christians accepting the Church's authority but also to the so-called "old-
believers" -- religious sectarians who refused to honor the church's 
innovations in liturgy and swore to uphold the old faith in the face of 
excommunication and persecution from the official church. 
The contiguity between the boundaries of ethnicity and religion in Russia 
had important implications for other religious confessions, be this Catholic, 
Protestant, Muslim, Jewish, or Buddhist. All those espousing non-Orthodox 
beliefs (inovertsy) were hard pressed to maintain their national identity as 
Russians and to act in a manner at least outwardly consistent with certain 
Orthodox ideas about propriety, authority, and loyalty. The right wing 
within Orthodoxy frequently saw conspiracies by the non-Orthodox, 
especially Jews, Masons and Catholics, as great threats to Mother Russia 
herself. Hence, such inovertsy experienced themselves and were 
perceived by others as not fully Russian -- a stigma they continue to carry 
today. 
In this century, the communist authorities worked hard to stamp out 
religious beliefs and replace old notions about Russian nationhood with the 
internationalist identity deemed proper for Soviet citizens. However, the 
old religious demarcation lines have not been erased completely. The 
atheist state professed by Stalin could not escape completely the 
formative influence of Russian Orthodoxy. Its vestiges shone through the 
public rituals and were clearly visible in the communist craving for political 
monopoly, cultural orthodoxy, and sanctimonious rigorism. 
How did Orthodox customs manage to survive in atheistic Soviet society? 
To understand this phenomenon I want to invoke Clifford Geertz's concept 
of "spiritual afterimages" which refers to "reflections, reverberations, 
projections" of religious experience in daily life. [1] Formed in an earlier 
era, such reflections, reverberations, and projections often resurface at a 
later point in the nation's history as moral imperatives and sentiments 
that continue to guide national development. These imperatives may lack 
the clarity and purpose that distinguished the original precepts, but they 
leave a distinct mark on successive generations, on the country's political, 
social, and economic practices. During periods of religious revival, spiritual 
afterimages regain much of their original vitality, sometimes suppressing 
secular social forms and spurring powerful fundamentalist movements. 
Along these lines we should see the current religious renaissance in Russia 
-- the increased church attendance, the desire to learn about the ancient 
saints, the longing for the wonders wrought by the holy people in the 
distant past, the renewed pilgrimage to holy places like Valaam (the 
monastery complex at the north end of Lake Ladoga) and Sarov (the 
home of St. Serafim). Through these practices, the spiritual afterimages of 
Russian history are revitalized and reincorporated into the nation's 
psyche. Besides these obvious stirrings, there are more subtle ways in 
which religious culture affects, and in turn is affected by, the 
developments in other domains of Russian culture. This confluence is not 
always benign. Given the historical precedents, we have to wonder if the 
authority of the Russian Orthodox Church will once again be used to 
legitimize the state's imperial ambitions, if the Church is ready to make 
concerted efforts to regain its spiritual autonomy, to encourage the 
growth of democratic political culture, to facilitate the transition to a 
market economy, to serve as a unifying force in these times of trouble. 
Such are weighty issues that have direct bearing on the future of Russian 
civilization. I cannot pretend to have answers to all the relevant questions, 
but I hope that the following discussion will clarify the stakes that Russian 
society has in these issues and shed some light on the future of Russian 
Orthodoxy. 
The Origins of Russian Religious Culture 
In 1988, the Russian Orthodox Church marked its first millennium. The 
festivities commemorated the time when Grand Prince Vladimir committed 
himself and his nation to Eastern Christianity, making it the official faith of 
ancient Rus. Vladimir did not seem to meet much opposition to conversion 
from the population, but it would be a mistake to conclude that conversion 
was always voluntary. The vestiges of ancient folk religion survived for 
centuries in Russia , suggesting that it was deeply established in the lands 
of Rus. The chronicles and legends record many instances when severe 
force had to be used by both Vladimir and his lieutenants. Novgorod 's 
conversion in particular was accompanied by a great deal of violence, and 
100 years later everyone in the city, except the clergy and the nobility, 
remained pagans and not Christians. [2] 
The paganism of Rus was weakly institutionalized -- there were no priests, 
temples, regular forms of worship, or a complex mythology -- but it 
seemed to have resonated deeply in people's hearts. As was generally the 
case with the Christianization of pagan nations, the new religion became 
more palatable through syncretism. Thus, "Perun the god of thunder 
becomes Elijah, with his chariot of fire; Veles becomes St. Blaise, and is 
still the patron of cattle." [3] As Fedotov [4] pointed out, the Christian cult 
of Mary was blended by ancient Rus with the Mother Earth and the female 
goddesses cult, one revolving around birth and the other governing 
individual destiny, so that Mary was cast as the mother of all mankind in 
Russian Orthodoxy. That is to say, when Christianity came to Rus and the 
Divine Motherhood cult was transferred to center on Theotokos ("Mother 
of God"), the old pagan mythology continued to evolve in the new 
Christian context. 
Local cults multiplied in response to this syncretism, and for the first few 
centuries after "conversion," the religion of Rus was in effect a "double 
faith," with Christian ritual and ceremony overlaying pagan holidays and 
festivals. [5] It took about six centuries for Christian piety to sink roots in 
the Russian people's heart, but once it did, it emerged in a stark form of 
severe ritual observance, constant crossing of oneself, genuflections, long 
night services, and the like. [6] At first, only the upper class had any clear 
idea about Christianity. The ruling class's religious knowledge remained 
insular because the clergy, drawn primarily from Constantinople , often 
did not speak Russian and communicated chiefly with the elite. Those 
Russians deeply involved in religious life sought to emulate, however 
unsuccessfully, the extreme asceticism of the Eastern Christian monastics, 
which further distanced them from the population. 
Over the next few centuries, the level of piety among the Russian clergy 
went down, as it absorbed more native Russians, lost its penchant for 
asceticism, and gradually switched to serving the ritual needs of the 
population. Whether or not anyone understood the ritual was not an issue 
any more. The noted Russian historian, Paul Miliukov, pointed out that the 
clergy stratum became rather illiterate at this time (which is why many 
Church historians decried this period as that of decline in the Church). Just 
as the clergy began to lose its cultural and educational edge, the 
population as a whole noticeably increased its level of Christian 
observance. By the fifteenth or sixteenth century, the clergy and the 
people converged on a middle ground, reaching the level of religious 
consciousness not deep enough to satisfy the ascetics but considerably 
loftier than the one common at the earlier "double faith" stage. 
It was the magic significance of the rite which became the cause and 
condition of its popularity [consistent with the old folk cult]. Therefore the 
rite served also as a middle course upon which met the upper and lower 
strata of Russian faith: the former gradually losing the true conception of 
the contents, the latter gradually gaining an approximate understanding of 
the form. [7] 
During this first 600 years of Christian influence, three major political 
developments had great significance for the fate of religion in Russia : the 
steady decline of Constantinople, the conquest of Rus by the Mongols, and 
the shift of the cultural-political center of Rus from Kiev to Moscow . 
Since Rus had allied itself with Byzantine Christianity centered in 
Constantinople, it was bound to feel the effects of Byzantium 's steady 
political decline. In 1453, the Turks finally captured Constantinople. Greek 
influence was not strong enough to smooth out the coarseness of Russian 
civilization before the thirteenth century, when the Tartars spread their 
yoke over Russia, drastically reducing its contacts with the Byzantines. 
Nevertheless, the Byzantine tradition and church administration left their 
distinct marks on Russia . This heritage of Eastern Christianity comes to 
the fore in the Church's subservience to state authority, a theme which 
acquired its very Russian overtones during the next 600 years. The 
second major legacy of Constantinople was the notion that the Greek 
Church was the only true church, all other Christian churches having fallen 
to heresy or corruption. [8] Constantinople continued to be the reference 
template for the Russian Church for many more years, but by the mid-
fifteenth century it lost whatever formal control it had over the Russian 
Church. The failure to unify the Eastern and Western branches of 
Christianity at the Council of Florence sealed the transformation of the 
Russian Orthodox Church into an autocephalic religious body. 
The choice of Eastern Christianity as a model for ancient Russia had a 
profound impact on the Russian Church , its spirituality and the culture 
that it fostered. First, there is the forcefully uprooted paganism present in 
the syncretic elements and manifest in the magical conception of the rites 
of the Church. However sincere and devout the Russian Christian, there is 
a sense in which he or she is living an unstable faith that could any 
moment devolve into untamed pagan practices. This might be part of the 
reason why the Russian Orthodox Church has always been so adamant 
about the eternal verities of the faith and the absolute truth it claims to 
hold in every religious sense. This persistent claim may reflect the need to 
control the undisciplined pagan within. Hence, doctrinal rigidity and 
inflexibility in ritual practice are part of Russian religious culture. 
Second, Constantinople 's claim that it is the only true successor to the 
ancient Christian Church, the claim that denigrated the Western Christian 
tradition, undercut the diversity within the Russian Church . Even minor 
doctrinal or ritual disagreement among the faithful was feared as inviting 
a schism. Christian movements outside the Orthodox Church could only be 
judged as heresy, thus subject to repression. Virtually no diversity in 
religious perspective or practice could be accommodated. Intolerance of 
dissent, therefore, could be listed as another distinct characteristic of 
Russian religious culture. 
Third, central importance in Eastern Christianity is accorded to the 
principle that the church must be unequivocally subordinated to the state. 
This precept was consistent with the Byzantine principle of symphonia, 
symbolizing the ultimate harmony of religion and government. As the 
Patriarch of Constantinople was required to submit to the Byzantine 
Emperor, so the Metropolitan and later Patriarch of Russia was to submit 
to the Tsar. The Eastern Churches were all built around a national 
conception of church. There was no central authority like the Catholic 
Pope, but there was a strong authority structure in each national church, 
which maintained respectful and concilliar relations with the other national 
churches of the Eastern communion. The head of state had to confirm -- 
and sometimes directly appointed -- the head bishop for a national 
church. The church and state leaders were to represent for their people 
the spiritual unity and truth of the one true church; therefore, there could 
be no major disagreement or separation between them. This principle 
produced the church subordinated to political authorities, a condition 
firmly established in Russia at least from the time of Peter I through the 
communist period. In more general terms, this practice informed a culture 
in which a discourse about political, economic or social issues could easily 
acquire an extra-mundane significance and generate a quasi-religious 
zeal. This propensity to raise ideological stakes, to treat routine 
differences as if they pertained to sacred matters would become typical of 
Russian culture in general and Russian religious culture in particular. 
Finally, there was the sharp opposition to the West that reflected the split 
of the Christian church into Eastern and Western churches. When the 
Western European Middle Ages exploded into Renaissance, Reformation 
and Enlightenment, the wall between East and West kept these great 
social upheavals from infecting Russia . And when the shock waves from 
these momentous developments finally reached Russia , their effect was 
only partial, often distorted, and sometimes the opposite of what 
transpired in the West. Thus, when Peter I imported Western European 
innovations in secular and religious governance to Russia -- most notably, 
the senate for the state and the synod for the church -- they were turned 
into the instruments of greater authoritarian control rather than broader 
popular participation. The state's dominion over the church is still among 
the most acute problems facing Russian Orthodoxy. 
It would be a mistake to view Russian religious culture in negative terms, 
to judge it exclusively by the extent to which it approximates Western 
beliefs and practices. Nurtured in the cradle of Eastern Christianity, 
Russian religious culture emerged extremely rich in its spiritual values and 
esthetics. It produced artistic works that continue to inspire us today. It 
had its share of saints and religious workers who spurred the faithful to 
keep the nation together when its breakdown seemed imminent. At the 
same time, we cannot close our eyes to the fact that its spirituality was 
flawed by the state which harnessed Orthodoxy for its imperial purposes, 
that Pravoslavie did not always provide moral guidance to the faithful in 
their everyday lives, that it failed to explore the interfaces between 
religious spirituality and personal freedom implicit in the Christian faith. 
These paradigmatic features of Russian religious culture were further 
reenforced during the subsequent periods of the national expansion under 
the Tsars and the communists. 
National Expansion and Orthodox Culture 
By the end of the fifteenth century, ancient Rus had been transformed into 
the sovereign state of Muscovy. Although there were still the neighboring 
states of Crimea, Astrakhan , and Kazan, which threatened the Russian 
state, the Tartar domination with its cultural and political insularity came 
to an end after the Golden Horde was defeated by Ivan III in 1480. With 
Constantinople vanquished by the Turks and the Pravoslavie coming into 
its own, the links with Russia 's old benefactor were now only symbolic. 
Even though the Patriarch of Constantinople reinstituted communion with 
Moscow and repudiated the Council of Florence after 1453 (the move had 
been motivated largely by the vain hope of military aid from Rome ), the 
Greek Church had irreversibly lost its prestige in Moscow 's eyes. 
Nevertheless, the idea of Greek Christianity as the only true religion had 
taken deep root, and Muscovy saw itself, after the seeming self-betrayal 
and ignominious demise of Constantinople , as the last representative of 
the true faith. Popular piety at the time consisted chiefly in formal 
adherence to ritual and the magical notion of rite reflecting the pagan 
legacy. Very little room was left for the spiritual dimension of the Christian 
faith. Authority in the Church was now vested in an indigenous hierarchy. 
The lower clergy remained largely illiterate, while the upper clergy and 
hierarchs were preoccupied with pleasing the princes who held the power 
of appointment and removal. When there was no more Byzantine Emperor 
to control the appointment of the Metropolitan, the job quite naturally 
devolved onto the Grand Prince, soon to be called Tsar. 
At this juncture, political aspirations and accomplishments merged with 
religious ideology to produce a peculiar national imagery captured in the 
heady slogan: "Moscow, the Third Rome." Its express function was to 
symbolize Muscovy's direct succession from the great apostolic see. Rome 
, it was reasoned, had fallen to the papal heresy and corruption, and was 
succeeded by Constantinople. Now the same diseases had subdued fair 
Byzantium. Was not its conquest by the heathen Turks proof of God's 
wrath at its heinous departure from the orthodox faith of the Apostles and 
Holy Councils? And who else but Muscovy matched in dignity and 
orthodoxy the prior supreme sees? Given its cultural and religious 
background, these ideas made good sense to 15th and 16th century 
Russians. Such ideas furnished fertile grounds on which political 
absolutism could flourish. Absolutism in politics had as its natural 
counterpart a status quoism in popular piety, a kind of religious formalism 
that replaced Christian spirituality and subordinated religious authority to 
state imperatives. Now all dissension could be nipped in the bud and 
ruthlessly expunged by a sacredly legitimized state power. And since the 
Tsar was sanctified by Church authority, any political opposition could 
easily be interpreted as apostasy or heresy. 
[Thus the Russian Church ] was now left for the first time face to face with 
the formidable power of Muscovite absolutism, with neither Constantinople 
nor Sarai to defend its ancient privileges against possible encroachments 
by the grand dukes [of Muscovy ]. The Church chose the road of 
submission and threw its influence to the support of the ambitions of the 
Moscow dynasty. [9] 
The removal of three metropolitans from their posts during the 16th 
century signaled the dynasty's willingness to exercise its powers as a 
divinely-appointed authority. [10] That religious and state powers fully 
merged became obvious when the Church canonized Prince Vladimir who 
turned Russia into a Christian state and the Russian state into a Church-
anointed power. Forever after, the religious afterimages embedded in the 
Russian faithfuls' psyche reminded them of the state's supremacy in all 
spiritual matters. Through the period of expansion following the defeat of 
the Tartars, the Church added new saints who likewise elevated state 
authority in the spiritual world of the faithful Orthodox believer. Many 
princes and tsars were canonized as saints, and especially important were 
those who served as warriors preserving the integrity of the Russian 
nation. Whatever their personal learning and holiness, Dmitry Donskoy, 
Alexandr Nevsky, and St. Sergius of Radonezh (who counselled Dmitry 
Donskoy and blessed his troops as they went to battle) distinguished 
themselves as actors who aided Russia's military and political expansion. 
Under the reigns of Ivan III (1462-1505) and Vasily III (1505-1533), a 
reconsolidated Rus made its debut upon the diplomatic stage of Europe as 
it expanded westward into the lands controlled by Lithuania. Contacts 
were established with the Holy Roman Empire , the Pope, France, 
Denmark, and other countries of Western Europe, as well as with Muscovy 
's immediate neighbors, Poland , Lithuania, Sweden, Hungary, and the 
Ottoman Empire. [11] Under Ivan IV (1533-1584), also known as "Ivan 
the Terrible" or "the Dread," Russian hegemony expanded southward to 
the Caspian Sea, including much of the older Tartar lands. Now, the 
Russian ruler could claim control as far as the Arctic Ocean in the North. 
Clearly, this was a time of great political success for Russia , which 
extended into the field of religion: Job, the Metropolitan of Moscow, was 
consecrated Patriarch of Moscow and all Russias in 1589 by the 
Constantinopolitan Patriarch Jeremy. This act, which confirmed the 
separation of the Russian Church from Constantinople , must have buoyed 
the Russian psyche, for "the Russian Church felt ashamed to be under the 
authority [at least technically] of a subject of the sultan." [12] Kluchevsky 
attributes this consecration and the psychological boost it gave to the 
nation largely to political, rather than religious, developments. 
Towards the opening of the seventeenth century that community [of Rus] 
was thoroughly permeated with religious self-confidence, but a self-
confidence which was fostered, not by the religious, but by the political, 
progress of Orthodox Rus, as well as by the political misfortunes of the 
Orthodox East. [13] 
From a religious point of view, the only blemish on Pravoslavie's 
supremacy in the Orthodox communion was that the Moscow Patriarchate 
ranked fifth in the formalized hierarchy of Eastern Christianity, after the 
ancient Patriarchates of Constantinople, Alexandria , Antioch , and 
Jerusalem , though before the older Patriarchate of Serbia. [14] Russia 's 
assertion of its religious superiority and its insistence on being the only 
universal church were not without serious drawbacks, however. 
As soon as Orthodox Rus proclaimed herself the sole possessor of 
Christian faith, that means of correction [of local deviation by universal 
Christianity] became lost to her, since, once it had declared itself to be the 
Church Universal, the Russian Church community could not very well 
permit any extraneous examination of its beliefs and rites. [15] 
This effectively arrested the development of Russian Orthodox religion at 
the point where the Church Universal doctrine commenced, i.e., in the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Thus, the grandson was obligated only 
to believe and practice as his grandfather did. [16] Ivan IV's strict 
formalism left a strong impression on the Church of his time, [17] and the 
pattern of strict outward piety (ritual, crossings, genuflections, etc.) 
became fully established as in the Russian Orthodoxy under Tsar Alexis 
(1645-1676), whose police measures forced it upon a previously lax and 
often indifferent population. [18] 
In fact, under the first Romanov Tsars, Michael (1613-1645) and Alexis, 
"The Church . . . was more than ever subservient to the wishes of the 
Kremlin." [19] Florinsky contends that in trying to cope with the post-
"Time of Troubles" political unrest and the contemporaneous enserfment 
of Russian peasantry, Michael and Alexis established a "totalitarian state" 
in which the church was deeply implicated. In particular, the vast 
ecclesiastical landholdings tied the Church to pro-serfdom policies. "In the 
man hunt for fugitive serfs, which was one of the distressing 
characteristics of this period [seventeenth century], ecclesiastical 
dignitaries and the monasteries vied with the lay landlords both in 
savagery and in resourcefulness." [20] 
The reign of Alexis was marked by one of the most important events in 
the history of the Russian Orthodox Church, the "Great Schism" of the Old 
Believers. This rupture, which shattered the unity of the Church, was not 
the first expression of dissent in religious matters. Russia got its tastes of 
religious fissure beforehand with the movements of the Strigolniki, the 
Judaizers, and the Volga Hermits. The religious ferment in the Polish areas 
in the sixteenth century especially reminded the Russians that they were 
also subject to non-indigenous religious traditions. In addition, residents 
of the larger cities saw Protestant and Catholic traders and diplomats, 
and, beginning with the reign of Michael (1613-1645), Westerners brought 
their own faiths along when they were invited to modernize the military 
and related economy. However, foreigners lived in segregated areas, thus 
reducing the impact of their cultures on local communities. There were 
important consequences of the imported and dissenting religions, but the 
problem of diversity came to a head only in the Old Believer schism. [21] 
This schism tells us a great deal about the nature of Russian Orthodoxy. 
The split occurred in reaction to reforms implemented by Patriarch Nikon. 
What did Nikon want to change? Looking at the concrete reforms, the 
modernized Westerner is struck by their apparent insignificance to overall 
faith. The reforms centered on local practices which had become 
customary in Russia and acquired an official sanction. The questions at 
issue were which icons to use and when, how to spell the name "Jesus," 
how many "alleluias" to say, how many wafers to use in a mass, fingers to 
extend while crossing oneself, etc. -- matters pertaining to external 
observance of rite and requiring no alteration of dogma. [22] 
The reaction to such seemingly innocuous reforms, however, was virulent. 
Old Believers contended that the things Nikon wanted to change were 
essential to salvation and thus immutable. For its part, the Russian Church 
hierarchy countered that the Old Believers had too narrow a mind-set to 
distinguish the essential from the superficial and accidental. However, the 
most important consequence of the Nikon reform was not for theology or 
Church practice but for Church-state relations and, less directly, for the 
possible opening to Western influence on Russian society and culture. The 
Nikon reforms "impinged upon the most sensitive chord in the attunement 
of the Russian Church community -- namely, upon its national self-
complacency in ecclesiastical matters." [23] The schism splintered the 
Church community and weakened its political voice, allowing secular 
power to emerge as a sole arbiter in religious disputes. Because many of 
its most avid believers went into schism, the Church was left chiefly with 
the "lukewarm" and indifferent in religious matters. This led to greater 
reliance on the state, police, and army to enforce the faith. 
The council that condemned both Nikon and the schismatics seemed to 
have been animated by a spirit of special service to the Tsar, some 
delegates candidly stating their wish to please him. Patriarchal authority 
vis-a-vis the Tsar was greatly diminished. Furthermore, a major decision 
of the council was to eliminate the parish election of priests which had 
been traditional in Russia , yielding to the bishops the task of assigning 
priests to parishes. With the state virtually dictating episcopal 
appointments, state control over the Church grew at the grassroots level 
as well. Thus, the council's main outcome "was to establish the clear 
subordination of church to state by flooding the church bureaucracy with 
priests who were, in effect, state appointed." [24] In sum, the schism 
reenforced the Church's subservience to the state and seeded more 
sanctity to the state authorities. [25] 
Seen across the one thousand years of Russian Church history, however, 
the Great Schism testified to the growing strength of popular Christian 
sensibilities. Even in their confused religiosity, the masses were finally 
identified with the Christian church. The Old Believers took the extreme 
path, often being pushed to suffering and martyrdom by the oppressive 
practices of the Church and the State. However, the plight of Old Believers 
dramatized the fact that the broader populace in Russia had been finally 
Christianized. Though there were to be some important religious 
developments for the elite, the faith of the common person was 
established at its general level for the next two hundred years. And while 
the Old Believers found themselves repeatedly at the core of peasant 
revolts, the regularity with which such revolts were crushed testified to 
the impracticality of popular movements in the face of the overwhelming 
state power. That pattern lasted into the twentieth century. The state and 
church reorganization carried out by Peter I settled the Church 
subordination to the state for the remainder of the period of the Russian 
Empire. First refusing to appoint a new Patriarch upon the death of 
Hadrian in 1700, then replacing the Patriarchate itself with the Holy Synod 
in 1721, the Emperor took total control over the Church into his own 
hands. Appointments to the Holy Synod and the synod's agenda were 
supervised by a lay officer, the Over Procurator, who was himself an 
appointee and servant of the Emperor. Consequently, until the Revolution 
of February 1917, the Church structure was an arm of the government 
bureaucracy and the popular faith languished in its seventeenth century 
form. 
In the two centuries between Peter's reign and 1917, two other 
developments took place that had implications for the modern religious 
culture. First is the appearance of a small population of Protestant and 
some Catholic believers on Russian soil. Found among German and other 
foreign peasant farmers imported by Catherine II to foster efficiency in 
agriculture, these faiths slowly began to mix with indigenous sectarians 
and Orthodox believers, offering them a glimpse of alternative religious 
cultures. Facing strong constraints against growth, including (especially in 
the mid-nineteenth century) legal and police barriers against proselytizing, 
these tiny groups began to breath and act a touch freer in the early 
twentieth century following legal reforms in 1903 and 1905. Still, at no 
point did they pose a significant threat to the established order. 
Another interesting development goes back to the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century when the elite showed new willingness to explore 
the frontiers of faith and engage in a serious discussion about the 
indigenous religious culture. The reign of Alexander I held some 
precursors, but Nicholas I closed off most avenues for innovation, even as 
its harsh rigidity provoked a revolt among the intelligentsia that was 
finally ready and willing to confront Western European ideas on their own 
merit. In the second half of the nineteenth century the clash of the 
Slavophiles and Westernizers was in full swing, with some intellectuals 
moving toward full secularization and others, especially toward the end of 
the 19th century, increasingly drawn to their Christian roots. I cannot 
dwell on this richly nuanced era of philosophical and theological revival. 
Let me just note the relative liberality that marked the reign of Alexander 
II and that provided a hospitable environment for a creative inquiry into 
religious matters. Had historical circumstances gone in other directions, 
this flourishing of religious discourse might have served as a launching 
pad for a true reformation in Russian Christianity. The Slavophile position 
had in itself currents of illiberality, but the arguments of the intellectuals 
of the era had begun to grapple with the most negative of these in a 
constructive way. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the 
philosophical and theological renewal clashed with the extreme nationalist, 
anti-semitic and xenophobic forces of the "Black Hundreds", which 
legitimized the pogroms and reveled in the struggle against all sorts of 
conspiratorial enemies of Russia. [26] Too often, churchmen were heard 
in support of the scapegoating of Jews by the Tsars and the assertions of 
special Russian privilege in a multiethnic empire and multinational world. 
Other things being equal, the renewal might have won out against such 
forces. Instead, Russia slid into the disorganization and revolts that 
engulfed the European continent in the wake of the First World War. And 
when the communists took power, the Church's dependence on the state 
proved exceedingly costly. The state triumphant was the state which 
bound the Church in chains and left the religious institution without the 
energy and resources to fend off perhaps the most devastating 
secularizing force in history -- Marxism-Leninism. 
Religion Under Soviet Rule 
Among the features of communist society that continuously fascinated 
Western observers was an ambitious Soviet policy aimed at transforming 
the human personality. Soviet ideology mandated that the "new Soviet 
person" be created from the raw materials of Russian citizenry. [27] The 
builder of communism was to be peace-loving, internationalist, patriotic, 
law-abiding, collectivistic, hard working, and -- militantly atheist. 
To promote atheism and stamp out "religious superstitions" among its 
citizens the state authorities and the Communist Party established a 
comprehensive educational program -- ateisticheskoe vospitanie, a term 
usually translated as "atheist upbringing." The Russian word vospitanie, 
for which there is no exact equivalent in English, refers to the general 
blueprints for character formation contrived by the Soviet authorities. 
[28] As conceived and carried out by the communist party experts, an 
atheist upbringing was not a simple educational program, although it was 
included in the school curricula and the pedagogical propaganda for the 
general public. More than that, ateisticheskoe vospitanie spurred a multi-
faceted effort across the lifespan to nurture atheism, to turn it into the 
way of thinking for every Soviet citizen. 
Normally, socialization is designed to inculcate some new knowledge or 
skill in the fledgling generation. Atheism, by contrast, is not so much a 
new knowledge to be imparted as an old belief to be expunged. Since 
religious knowledge of some sort is generally widespread, pursuing atheist 
upbringing in the U.S.S.R. was similar to trying to create a vacuum. The 
ultimate Soviet Marxist aim was to develop a purified environment where 
the particles of religious faith were so rarified that the vacuum in the 
religious area could become self-sustaining. In the ideological imagery, 
such a situation would represent a pure environment where the full 
character development of the new communist person could take place 
unhindered. Soviet atheist upbringing, therefore, was not simply the 
obverse of religious socialization in the West. The forces working against 
atheism were no less entrenched in Soviet Russia than, say, in the United 
States , where organized atheism and atheist convictions have been 
historically weak in both numbers and popular support. Routing popular 
religiosity in the U.S.S.R., therefore, was a truly daunting task. 
Furthermore, while atheism is not inconsistent with the secularizing trends 
set in motion by urbanization, industrialization, and modernization, 
[29]Soviet ideological interpretation was unique in its stated agenda of 
speeding up and deepening general secularization, the latter being 
construed as a precondition for the emergence of a well-rounded 
personality. An atheist upbringing, consequently, went far beyond 
attempts to neutralize religion, relegate it to a private corner of the 
individual's spiritual life; it implied a coherent anti-religious "worldview" 
and an appropriate agenda for action without which Soviet society could 
not reach its ultimate -- communist -- developmental stage. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, an atheist upbringing in the Soviet 
Union differed from religious socialization in the West insofar as it was a 
planned effort organized and orchestrated by the Soviet state and 
mandatory for every segment of the Soviet population. In other words, it 
was state policy and, as we shall see, politics. Thus, even in its basic form, 
"scientific atheism" propagated by Soviet ideologues fundamentally 
diverged from the largely voluntaristic and diverse activities carried out in 
the West under the banners of parochial education, proselytization, and 
evangelization. 
Political factors. State atheism varied in its nature, focus, and intensity 
over the course of Soviet history. This shifting policy meant that 
succeeding generations did not experience the atheist program in the 
same way, that the program had varying impact on Soviet citizens. We 
can count three major antireligious campaigns and one period of dramatic 
let up in anti-religious zeal in the pre-Gorbachev period of Soviet history. 
[30] The first attack on religion came immediately after the October 
Revolution of 1917. Its primary targets were the Orthodox Church and the 
Muslim establishment; its immediate aim -- to sap the sources of real and 
potential counter-revolution. By the mid 20s, a modus operandi for 
religious activities, albeit much more limited and controlled than before 
the Revolution, had been established. This rather shaky status quo was 
disrupted with a crackdown on religious institutions during the "forced 
collectivization" (1928-1933) when many churches and religious 
establishments were closed, most significant religious leaders imprisoned, 
and religious activity in the country reduced to a bare minimum. This 
campaign was followed by a period of severe restrictions of all religious 
activities during the 30s. 
As World War II broke out, however, the Party leaders realized the 
Church's potential as a cradle of patriotic sentiments and dramatically 
reversed their stance on religion. Although Stalinist police closely 
supervised the reinvigorated religious groups to ensure that the religious 
revival would not get out of hand, relative peace prevailed in state-church 
relations from 1943 until Stalin's death in 1953. This period ended when 
the Khrushchev regime set in motion a new antireligious campaign fully 
comparable to the one that rocked the country at the beginning of the 
30s. Subsequently, with the demise of Khrushchev in 1964, the campaign 
was modulated. The Brezhnev era ushered in some new openings for the 
private practice of religion and for official religious organizations, although 
pressures continued against religious dissidents and those who would seek 
to expand the sphere of religious activities into evangelization, religious 
education for children, and church expansion. 
In contrast to problems of military security and national economic 
development, Soviet state atheism was a relatively minor policy issue. 
According to Bociurkiw [31] , the fluctuations in religious policy largely 
reflected factors outside the religious sphere, such as nationality, peasant, 
industrial or military policy. A closer look at these factors suggests that 
Soviet state atheism was largely political in its nature and influence upon 
the population. There were many factors extraneous to religion proper 
which affected religious policy and thus altered the impact of state 
atheism upon the people. 
Social and Institutional Factors. An atheist upbringing was shaped by and, 
in turn, shaped many social circumstances that had a bearing on 
antireligious socialization patterns. Important in this respect is to 
distinguish between the individual and collectivist aspects of socialization: 
Relative to the individual, socialization means all those processes through 
which the individual in interaction with the environment and with himself 
develops relatively enduring patterns of behavior which enable him to take 
part in societal life and in certain cases, to participate in its change. 
Relative to the collectivity, socialization indicates the differentiated, and 
under certain conditions contradictory, interaction of all those societal 
institutions which express the economical, political and cultural 
conceptions of the task of caring for and educating children, who are 
ultimately individuals with identities. [32] 
Central in this insight is that socialization involves institutional interactions 
which may be contradictory at times. The potential for "contradictory" 
socialization is something that we should acknowledge from the start. 
Anyone who visited the U.S.S.R. could have sensed these contradictions in 
the atheist upbringing of Soviet citizens. The Soviet propaganda's 
manifest message was unambiguous: religion was to be stamped out as a 
vestige of the past impeding progress toward the future society envisioned 
by Marx, Engels, and Lenin. However, latent messages conveyed by the 
same propaganda were rather confusing to Soviet citizens. For example, 
the state-sponsored movement to salvage and restore national 
monuments and artistic works extended to certain religious artifacts. It 
did not escape notice at home and abroad that the Soviet authorities 
adopted an onion dome of the Orthodox Church as the nation's aesthetic 
emblem. 
In a similarly contradictory way, Soviets celebrated the events and heroes 
closely aligned with the nation's religious history. One case in point -- the 
state-sponsored festivities surrounding the inauguration of the monument 
to Prince Vladimir, long ago canonized by the Church and now holding 
aloft the very same cross that once topped the Novgorod monument 
dedicated to 1000 years of Russia. Similarly, the communist authorities 
honored the Russian icon with its resplendid Christian imagery -- by far 
the best-known form of visual art in Russia -- as a national aesthetic 
treasure. Literary works by Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy, and lesser writers 
continued to feed religious themes to Soviet readers. Through such 
diverse channels religious symbols, myths, and institutional memories 
were preserved in the nation whose leaders dedicated themselves to 
atheism. Thus, the authorities themselves kept religious sentiments alive 
by their inconsistent actions. 
In these and many other ways, the institutional context of Soviet atheist 
socialization remained highly schizophrenic, causing problems for atheistic 
propaganda. While pedagogical institutions doggedly 
pursued ateisticheskoe vospitanie, other institutional spheres acted at 
cross-purpose. Literature and the arts proved particularly recalcitrant in 
this respect, their practitioners unable and unwilling to ignore the religious 
and mystical well-springs of earlier creativity. Special mention deserves 
also babushka -- old grandmother, the basic source of primary bonding in 
Russia, the kind which social psychologists find the most effective in 
shaping personal character in its formative stages. [33] Undaunted by 
official propaganda,babushka crossed herself, went to church, told her 
grandchildren old tales, and in the long run quietly undid what endless 
lectures and required readings tried to achieve through formal atheist 
upbringing. Soviet authorities were well aware of this menacing presence. 
In 1966, one V. G. Shtiuka wrote: 
The study of the religiousness of the population shows that religio-cultic 
activities which have solidly rooted themselves in everyday life and have 
become traditions of family life are the most tenacious. Precisely here 
remain the most broad channels for the penetration of religious ideology 
and religious worldview into the people's consciousness. [34] 
In the landmark studies of displaced persons from Russia that were 
carried out following World War II, the Harvard Project researchers made 
a special effort to assess the impact that Soviet socialization had on 
various social domains, including the religious sphere. Inkeles and Bauer 
[35]reported that the emigres experienced conflict in socialization related 
to traditional values like religion. Some (especially people from peasant 
and working class backgrounds) intimated that the public atheist 
education led to clashes at home, with parents and grandparents often 
looking askance at the atheistic beliefs children acquired at school. 
To assess the impact that atheistic education had on Soviet citizens we 
need to take a closer look at the educational practices insofar as they 
entail what Ernest Q. Campbell [36] calls social control imperative and 
socialization objective. [37] The former refers to vospitanie as it 
endeavors to squelch religious impulses and relies on punishments for 
religious behavior and attitudes. The latter involves building the free 
atheist character, i.e., rewarding atheist and antireligious behavior and 
attitudes. Some aspects of atheist upbringing seem to mix negative and 
positive elements of socialization. Both punishment and reward factors are 
evident when it comes to the legitimation problem that established 
authorities face in their anti-religious propaganda. Rebellion or less 
dramatic disregard for authority may lead to punishment, but acceptance 
and recognition of the official messages may provide some direct rewards. 
Let us review each major aspect of atheist upbringing -- building 
legitimacy, socialization objectives, and social control requirements. 
The Problem of Legitimacy. To legitimize itself in the public mind, the 
state (government, party) can not rely exclusively on force; it must 
socialize the populace into believing that its cause is a righteous one. 
Thus, all children, future adult citizens, must learn to think that the state 
knows the best, acts in everybody's interests, and can do the job of 
improving social conditions in an efficient manner. Up to a point, the state 
can count on loyalty of its citizens simply because it holds power and 
carries out routine tasks without which life would be difficult. The state's 
legitimacy has to strike deeper roots, however, if it is to be based on any 
other foundation than force, and that means suppressing alternative 
sources of legitimacy, most notably, the belief that governments rule by 
the grace of God and require divine consent. The Soviet version of "civics 
class," therefore, had to absorb atheistic education designed to clear up 
"old religious prejudices" and make room for the doctrine that props up 
the communist government. 
More than that, Soviet educators sought to coopt religious sentiments by 
creating quasi-ritual and ceremonial activities organized into so-called 
"new socialist traditions." [38] Here is a list of common Soviet institutions 
and rites sanctioned by the state: 
(1) Sometime after World War II, Wedding Palaces sprang to life, where a 
secular marriage ceremony was conducted in which newlyweds dedicated 
themselves and their future children to building communism and 
cultivating communist habits and beliefs. To inject a patriotic element into 
marriage, Soviet couples were encouraged to visit local war memorials in 
conjunction with their marriages. 
(2) Secular funerals replaced appropriate religious ceremonies, with the 
deceased celebrated for their contribution to the socialist state and the 
survivors pledging to continue their patriotic deeds. 
(3) Elaborate "rites of passage" solemnized such occasions as starting 
school, graduations, entering the workforce, joining the Octobrists, 
Pioneers, the young Communist League (Komsomol), acquiring identity 
papers (internal passport), etc. 
(4) The old religious holidays (like Christmas and Easter) were replaced 
with New Year celebrations, May 1 demonstrations, the Bolshevik 
Revolution Anniversary Parade, Lenin's birthday festivities, etc. 
The success of these "new traditions" varied widely, but they seemed to 
attract considerable popular participation. It is not clear whether they 
effectively replaced comparable religious rites and ceremonies, but they 
certainly helped cement the emotional bond between citizens and the 
state. To the extent that such socialist rituals turned into public habits, 
they enhanced the state's legitimacy. Most certainly, they strengthened 
other messages the state sought to convey to its citizens, including those 
with an expressly antireligious content. By providing a positive emotional 
bond with the state, which itself promoted atheistic and antireligious 
behaviors and attitudes, the new ceremonies and celebrations helped 
engrain atheism in the person's self-identity. Being religious and at the 
same time enjoying socialist rites would have created a psychological 
dissonance. We know from many studies in social psychology that it is 
difficult to maintain such inconsistencies for long periods without 
consequences that are damaging to the person. 
Socialization objectives. The atheistic socialization agenda included a wide 
range of positive incentives. Proper behavior and attitudes were 
reenforced by legitimate authority and thus carried a positive emotional 
charge. Atheistic socialization had as its ultimate goal what Soviet writers 
called "a scientific atheistic worldview," which included the following 
elements: 
(1) Strong scientific training awaited all students, starting from the 
earliest grades. Science was always taught as the indubitable and entirely 
sufficient way of understanding the world that left no room for alternative 
orientations. All other perspectives, most notably religion, were said to be 
incompatible with science and distorting of reality. 
(2) A special emphasis was placed on the notion that humans make their 
own futures. There were no supernatural forces or divine entities which 
had any relation to the world. In Marxian terms, science was the surest 
basis for building the future because it recognized the true nature of the 
world. 
(3) Atheistic socialization required teaching about the history of 
freethought and atheism, as well as about "religious obscurantism" that 
undermined the progress of science. 
(4) Atheism had to have its "positive heroes" -- Charles Darwin, Galileo, 
Copernicus, and others. The abundant literature on such characters served 
an important socialization goal of creating "reference idols" to encourage 
the youth in particular to emulate atheistic values. [39] 
(5) Movies and newspapers, television and radio, literature and painting -- 
all forms of mass culture had to be upgraded in content, so as to woo the 
population away from religious spectacles. For instance, during the Easter 
holidays the state would show especially popular programs on TV and 
keep movie theaters open into the late hours to keep the populace from 
attending all night Easter services. 
(6) Atheist propaganda was carried out by a sprawling set of agencies and 
organizations, such as the Museum of Religion and Atheism and 
Knowledge Society, [40] which printed pamphlets and books, offered 
public lectures and presentations. 
Through all these socializing institutions and practices the authorities 
sought to provide models of atheist behavior and attitudes for average 
Soviet citizens, to turn them into "good atheists" intolerant of religioznoe 
mrakobesie (religious obscurantism). But the same outcomes could be, 
and sometimes had to be, accomplished through other means, like 
punishments and costs inflicted on the believers to discourage them from 
practicing proscribed behavior. 
Social Control Imperatives. Soviet believers who evaded the socialization 
efforts mounted by the state had to bear excessive costs for their religious 
activities. The state did everything it could to "overcome" religion 
peaceably, to make it "wither away," but when its "constructive" efforts 
failed, it was ready to deploy a vast array of social control devices to 
stamp out religious customs. Here are some of the more important social 
control venues favored by the Soviet state: 
(1) Forbidding formal religious education for children, that is, any group 
classes, Sunday schools, etc. 
(2) Hindering the participation of children in religious activities by 
pressuring and intimidating clergy, parents, and children themselves 
(usually in school). 
(3) Controlling baptism rites, i.e., requiring a formal "registration" and a 
"permit" for a baptism ceremony. 
(4) Ridiculing or criticizing believers in the public press. 
(5) Intentionally and actively seeking out believers and attempting to "re-
educate" them. School teachers played a particularly important role in this 
regard, as did Pioneer and Komsomol cadres, Party and trade union 
activists at the workplace. Adults could also be force into one-on-one 
sessions with atheist activists. 
(6) Publishing and disseminating antireligious propaganda through 
literature, lectures, newspaper articles, radio, and television programs. 
The Knowledge Society has to be singled out here for its relentless efforts 
on behalf of "scientific atheism," though the trade unions, party cells, 
atheist clubs, and antireligious museums did not lag far behind. 
(7) Manipulating religious leaders so as to limit their personal influence 
and ability to organize and disseminate religious influence. 
(8) Limiting the prospects for appointment and job advancement for 
religious believers. Since most high level positions required party 
membership, believers were naturally excluded from advancement to such 
levels. In some cases, believers were denied routine pay increases and 
promotions because of their "backward views." Though this was not 
universal practice, it encouraged believers to be less visibly active 
religiously or hide their faith altogether, and it intimidated those who were 
not active from becoming so. 
In these and perhaps other ways, the Soviet state barred children from 
sympathetic exposure to religion and punished those who defied the state 
and sought to exercise their nominal constitutional rights. Needless to say, 
children who passed through this elaborate system of antireligious 
propaganda were less likely to become religious adults, while those who 
persisted in their religious beliefs and practices could expect their life 
options to be severely curtailed by the state. 
The Fate of Religion in the Post-Soviet Era 
The atheist upbringing in Soviet society was fraught with many problems, 
and as time revealed, had little resonance among the general population. 
However, it had been undertaken in the context of the Russian religious 
culture, and as such, was bound to have reverberated throughout society. 
We can recall that Pravoslavie or Orthodoxy was imposed upon the pagan 
population from above and never fully replaced the ancient religious 
customs with the new forms of spirituality and spiritual discipline. Cultural 
development nearly stopped at the point where Christian rituals were 
implanted in everyday consciousness without transforming its spiritual 
content. The Orthodox Church tended to equate religiosity with ritual. No 
attempt was ever made by the Church to foster a religiously literate 
population. In fact, for a long time, Russian Orthodoxy eschewed general 
literacy as a worthy goal. Even less so was the religious establishment in 
Russia committed to a critical inquiry into its spiritual moorings, to 
instilling an open-minded attitude toward religious practices among its 
participants. A kind of religious renaissance that the intellectual elite 
experienced before the Revolution of 1917 came to a grinding halt after 
the Bolsheviks came to power and made it all but impossible to convert 
this movement into a popular religious renaissance. The communists' 
attack on the Church exhausted its leadership and sealed its subservient 
status in a relationship that harkens back to the Byzantine principle of 
symphonia. Dogmatism, religious formalism, intolerance to dissent -- 
some of the salient features of the Russian religious culture -- were 
further reenforced by the autocratic communist practices. With religious 
leaders and intellectuals effectively silenced, the common faithful had few 
means of preserving anything more than a flawed memory of Orthodoxy 
along with the sentimental attachment to the beauty of Russian Orthodox 
liturgy. By the end of the Soviet era, Russians were a religiously 
malformed people, who sustained heavy damage, both individually and 
institutionally, from the decades of party-sponsored atheism overlain upon 
centuries of religious submission to autocracy. 
While Orthodoxy is prone to celebrate its martyrs above all saints, nobody 
is denying the blessings that religious freedom gave to the believers in the 
mid-80s. Religious freedom had arrived, first, surreptitiously, as the state 
lapsed in its efforts to enforce antireligious laws, then more openly, 
beginning with the decision to release religious prisoners of conscience in 
1986-87. From that point on, believers faced fewer problems registering 
their congregations. Liberalization gained momentum after the 1988 
festivities surrounding the thousand years of Russian Orthodoxy. This 
glorious event opened up auspiciously with General Secretary Gorbachev 
granting an audience to the Patriarch and chief bishops. About the same 
time, drafts of new laws on "freedom of conscience and religious 
organizations" reached the public. After extended public discussion, final 
versions thereof were adopted by both the U.S.S.R. and the Russian 
Republic in October 1990. These laws eliminated the primary means by 
which the Soviet government waged its war on religion since the end of 
the 1920s and finally permitted -- for the first time in over fifty years -- 
what most people elsewhere in the world would consider normal religious 
worship. [41] The Orthodox and other religious believers in the USSR 
were just getting adapted to the new circumstances when the whole state 
structure of the Soviet Union collapsed in late 1991. 
Seldom does a religious institution find itself in such a truly historic 
circumstance as that which the Russian Church faces today. The changes 
engulfing Russia have portents not only for its citizens but for the whole 
world. A vigorous, decisive, democratic church might wield great influence 
on the direction of those important changes. Such a church would possess 
a social ethic conducive to democratic ideology and free market 
entrepreneurship. It would spearhead a debate about society's values and 
goals, as well as spell out its own agenda in the various arenas of policy 
planning. It would exercise its spiritual influence on the population and 
shape the spiritual identity of the newly emerging autonomous nation. To 
paraphrase Richard John Neuhaus, a Protestant theologian, such a church 
should be a visible presence in the public square. Has the Russian 
Orthodox Church established a permanent residence there? 
Physically, the Russian Orthodox Church is quickly re-establishing itself on 
the town square. Since 1988, when Gorbachev and the leaders of the 
Russian Orthodox Church met for the first time, the number of 
congregations and operating churches has burgeoned. According to one 
source, this number nearly doubled between 1985 and 1991, going from 
6,806 to approximately 12,000 [42] . However, the costs of this 
expansion have been extremely high. Without many outlets for its 
resources, the Russian Church had grown used to being relatively well off 
under the Soviets. Now, the Church has been essentially bankrupted by its 
rapid expansion. We should bear in mind that institutions are real and 
organized societal beings, that they are in conflict and competition for the 
hearts of the people. So far, the state has been a big winner in its 
competition with the Russian Church. The question now is whether the 
religious institution has the means to mount a new drive to better 
counter-balance over-etatization in society. 
The Church's bankruptcy is apparent not only in monetary terms. The 
Church's spiritual and theological resources are stretched to the limit, as 
well. First, there are not enough clergy to serve all the new parishes. 
Second, the Church does not have the ability to compensate adequately 
those who are serving. Third, to satisfy the growing demand for clergy, 
priests work excessive hours, with very little time left for new initiatives or 
even simple reflection. Furthermore, the Church has yet to address fully 
and effectively (which is not easy to do under the present trying 
circumstances) the serious issue of the theological preparation of the 
clergy. As in the past, the Church has stressed the liturgical preparation of 
its clerics over their intellectual or spiritual preparations. Recognizing that 
the people of the parishes want someone to provide the sacraments, 
baptize, marry, and bury them, the Church has responded by enlarging 
seminary classes without the requisite increase in faculty and staff. New 
teaching resources are sorely missing; there is a tendency to fall back on 
the nineteenth century and earlier precedents. Very little constructive 
energy has been expended to find the meeting ground 
between Pravoslavie and twentieth century religious experience. In other 
words, while the church may be re-occupying the public square physically 
-- by breaking into the open, reaching out to the public, reclaiming its 
property once confiscated by the state -- it has yet to occupy the square 
spiritually, as a social force to reckon with in the giant reconstruction now 
facing the nation. 
We cannot be too harsh in our judgment, though, for the problems facing 
the Russian Orthodox Church are enormous, indeed. The devout Russian 
Orthodox believer needs first and foremost a "spiritual father"; he needs 
to restore the historical bond with a priest or monk with whom he has a 
special relationship of trust and confidence. Alas, the clergy today are too 
overburdened with the ritual services to provide inspiration, spiritual 
guidance, and a clear vision of the future to everyone. But we need to 
remind ourselves that Russia is not the only place where religious 
institutions show signs of exhaustion. Richard John Neuhaus expressed his 
deep concerns about the disappearance of religious values and symbols 
from public discourse in America in the 80s [43] . We can hardly expect 
that such values and symbols could spring to life overnight under the 
extreme conditions in today's Russia. Moreover, we have to be concerned 
about the abuse of religious rhetoric by the leaders of nativist, ultra-
conservative movements. Numerous right wing political and nationalist 
groups have risen up in Russia since the onset of Perestroika, some of 
them tracing their roots back to pre-revolutionary movements. Some of 
the leaders of such groups have begun utilizing religious language in their 
calls for a return of Russia to her "greater destiny", and there are 
noteworthy proponents among the clergy and hierarchs of the Russian 
Orthodox Church who appear to be supporters. Traditional Russian 
Orthodox anti-semitism has not been bridled on the extreme wings, and it 
supports the reappearance in bookstalls of the scurrilous Protocols of the 
Elders of Zion and other hate literature. While Patriarch Alexii II has 
denied anti-semitism in Church affairs, his administration has not 
mounted a direct attack on this problem. Without church leadership in this 
regard, Pamyat and similar nationalist-patriotic groupings have pursued 
their dark agendas with the support of extremist churchmen who 
experience no censure from their spiritual authorities. [44] 
In the legal arena itself, the Church has decided to be silent. Several 
major churchmen were elected to the Gorbachev and then Russian 
Federation Parliament, including the Patriarch, the most powerful bishops, 
and a number of priests. Yet last year, the Patriarch ruled that clergy were 
no longer permitted to run for such offices. When Father Gleb Yakunin 
defied the decree, he was defrocked and publicly humiliated by the 
Patriarch. Ironically, Yakunin had been at odds with the Church hierarchy 
for nearly all his adult life. In 1991, he revealed some KGB records (since 
sealed) that indicated the close cooperation between several key bishops 
and the Soviet secret police. In 1993, from his seat in the Russian 
Parliament, Fr. Yakunin vigorously opposed the legislation on religious 
affairs sponsored by the Russian Orthodox Church. The law would have 
reinstated registration for all religious groups and organizations, limited 
the activities of foreign missionaries in Russia, and restored the Russian 
Orthodox Church's privileged position in the land. The manner in which 
the Patriarchate treated Fr. Yakunin indicates its unwillingness to engage 
in debate over its own position in Russian society, its freedom to stamp 
out dissent among its ranks, its right to limit alternative forms of religious 
expression. This stance showed no tolerance for diversity, nor did it 
encourage constructive debate with its opponents inside and outside the 
Church. Dissenting views were handled in a sadly familiar way: exclusion, 
condemnation, excommunication. 
Only in the areas of direct interest to the Church has the latter taken an 
active role in the political process. Otherwise, as the run-up to the 
December 1993 elections demonstrated, the Church authorities failed to 
connect their faith and their politics. No sense of moral obligation seemed 
to inform the clergy's politics, which is conspicuous for its absence in the 
seminaries, where no attempt is currently under way to initiate a coherent 
political discussion. This public square was naked indeed. The 
predominant impulse was to escape from the tough political fray into the 
comforting spiritual ether of the liturgy. Perhaps these developments will 
take time to unfold, but a religious culture that could sustain them is yet 
to take root. The cultural history I sketched above does not bode well for 
the Church's action in the public arena, certainly not in the immediate 
future. 
There are some rays of hope, however. A tiny minority of Orthodox did 
join Protestant and Catholic dissenters in movements of protest in the 
60s, 70s and 80s; the dissidents of the 90s challenge the Church to lay 
out a new path through Russian nationalism or secular democratic 
institutions that meets the current needs and fills the spiritual vacuum left 
by the collapse of Marxist ideology. Gleb Yakunin and his colleagues 
among Christian democrats are trying to include religious values and 
ideals in the public debates about Russia's future. Priests and lay activists 
here and there are embarking on programs of direct involvement in socio-
political life through community or educational initiatives. 
Another promising sign is the widespread Sunday School movement that 
could foster a religious literacy previously unknown among the Russian 
Orthodox. It could also encourage a religious voluntarism that offers a 
healthy antidote to excessive hierarchical control. 
Another bit of evidence that some believers in Russia are rising to the 
occasion and meeting current challenges is the spread of charitable 
projects enlivening churches around the country. Still in its infancy, the 
movement to set up special services for the elderly, the imprisoned, the 
infirm, and the impoverished may invigorate Russian Orthodoxy as a 
whole. Together with international organizations and services, it may help 
spread a new social ethic of responsibility. 
Finally, there are some signs that the crusty Church hierarchy is not 
totally inflexible. The Patriarchate itself sponsored a major interfaith 
conference in June 1994 dedicated to the search for solutions to 
interethnic and other conflicts on the territory of the former Soviet Union. 
It was noteworthy that representatives of all major confessions on former 
Soviet territory were invited and included among the delegates. An 
ecumenical spirit concerning the solution of these conflicts was strongly 
expressed by the conferees; such cooperative efforts may bear fruits even 
in the more directly religious sphere itself. This conference was 
particularly important in that it broke the mold of the Communist past, 
when discussions were limited to restricted topics, and the Russian 
churchmen were compelled to keep public statements in line with Party 
doctrine. This time, conversations in the halls and hotel rooms were frank, 
and disputes were publicly aired in ways not thought possible before the 
last few years. 
In the meantime, the Church establishment tends to revert to ancient 
patterns, seeking to maintain or reestablish its privileged status in Russian 
society. It is particularly incensed with the non-Orthodox religious groups 
engaged in a major push to convert Russians to a different view, to offer 
the population a new way in the context of religious freedom. Seeing the 
troops of the Western evangelistic crusade gathered in stadiums in prayer, 
the Russian Orthodox Church hierarchy launched its own campaign to put 
up barriers between the spiritual invaders and the Russian people. The 
Summer of 1993 saw a fascinating legislative battle waged in Moscow in 
which Orthodox spiritual discipline was at issue. The Church hierarchy 
sought to construct a wall between the missionaries and the Russians, to 
keep the missionaries at bay, to keep the Russian spiritual menu clear of 
unsafe (though savory) contaminants like Western religion. Had it not 
been for the confrontation between President Yeltsin and the Parliament in 
early October, the legislation limiting the access of Western evangelicals 
to Russia might now be on the books. Yeltsin had opposed this legislation 
on several grounds but might not have been able to completely reject it in 
the end. The Church's determination to limit religious freedom is facing 
great criticism from democrats inside Russia as well as external advocates 
of individualistic human rights. 
The path ahead is a tortuous one. Old elements must be purged, to be 
sure, but the bedrock of the tradition cannot be abandoned. The cultural 
transformation required is vast; it may be excruciatingly painful, given 
that Pravoslavie faces its reconstruction exhausted by the Communist era, 
and now further drained by the huge costs of energy, time, and money 
required for rebuilding its crumbling infrastructure. While thousands of 
church buildings have been returned to the Church, most of them are in 
need of extensive and costly repair; many are, in the words of one bishop, 
"simply ruins" that must be totally reconstructed. There is an acute 
shortage of clergy, so the Church has to focus on the quick training of 
ritual specialists. And yet, somehow, the Church must develop the broader 
pastoral, theological, and philosophical concerns that could fill the public's 
needs the most. Can the Church find the resources to serve the great 
spiritual needs of the liberated population? Or will other aspirants to the 
status of religious supplier to Russia become more successful in fulfilling 
these yearnings, thus leading the transformation of Russian religious 
culture away from its historical Orthodox roots? 
Experience in other countries suggests that, if general religious freedom 
persists, Russia is likely to become a great deal more diverse in its 
religious culture. While Orthodoxy recoups its strengths, other "religious 
entrepreneurs" will win a significant share of the religious market in 
Russia. Still, the daunting question persists: will the Orthodox Church 
continue to stress the form, encourage nativistic elements in the 
government, and deny the newer groups access to the population? Stated 
differently, will the Church put nationalistic goals and church-state unity 
above service to the spiritual needs of the population? 
One element that is affecting the Russian religious scene these days as 
never before is international religious culture. Historically, Russia was 
insulated from the outside religious currents. Now, it cannot afford to be 
completely isolated. Though the Russian Orthodox Church has grown 
weary of ecumenical efforts, this international element gives one hope 
that it will continue to evolve in order to serve better its members' 
spiritual needs. Global culture may provide some of the innovations that 
will stimulate the broader revival of religion in Russia. The mature post-
communist Russia that one day will emerge after this present period of 
massive reconstruction will not simply ape Western society, as so many 
outsiders who put their entire stock in capitalist economics insist. We 
cannot say which shape the Russian civilization will take in the future, but 
we can venture a guess that it will reflect both the nation's historical 
religious afterimages and its present religious experience that whittles 
away at the old religious culture and broadens the horizons of Russian 
Orthodoxy. 
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